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UNCAUSED BEGINNINGS
Graham Oppy

I defend the view that it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state
under the causal relation even though it is impossible for any other (nonoverlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. I claim that, while there are
good theoretical and commonsense grounds for maintaining that it is simply not possible for non-initial parts of reality to have no cause, these good
grounds do not require one to claim that it is impossible that reality has an
uncaused initial state.

There are many possible models for the causal shape of reality. Amongst the
simple models to be considered—even if only to be subsequently rejected
as models of real possibilities—we should certainly mention: REGRESS,
CIRCLE, NECESSARY INITIAL STATE, and CONTINGENT INITIAL
STATE.1 (According to REGRESS, each state of reality is preceded by some
other state of reality under the causal relation. According to CIRCLE, the
states of reality form a circle under the causal relation. According to NECESSARY INITIAL STATE, there is an initial state that is prior to all other
states under the ancestral of the causal relation, and it is necessarily the
case that there is an initial state of this kind under the causal relation. According to CONTINGENT INITIAL STATE, there is an initial state that is
prior to all other states under the ancestral of the causal relation, but it is
only contingently the case that there is an initial state of this kind under
the causal relation.)
Each of these simple models admits of both theistic and naturalistic
interpretations. It is widely recognised that in several of these cases—
REGRESS, CIRCLE, CONTINGENT INITIAL STATE—naturalism would
be preferable to theism: if reality had the causal shape in question, then
there would be good—albeit defeasible—reason to accept naturalism and
to reject theism.
I think that naturalism is preferable to theism even in the case of NECESSARY INITIAL STATE. Consequently, I think that considerations about
the causal shape of reality provide grounds for naturalism: for I judge that,
on any of the most plausible causal shapes that might be taken by reality,
naturalism is more plausible than theism. Of course, these judgments of
1
NECESSARY INITIAL STATE and CONTINGENT INITIAL STATE come in different
sub-varieties, depending upon the number of possible initial states that are countenanced
(one or many).
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mine are highly controversial; however, what seems less controversial is
that the grounds for naturalism are strengthened if the models on which
naturalism is clearly preferable to theism remain in play.
In this paper, I shall be examining an argument for the claim that CONTINGENT INITIAL STATE is not a model that should be kept in play. This
argument runs as follows.
1. If it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the
causal relation—i.e. it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state that has no cause—then it is possible for other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. (Premise)
2. It is not possible for other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have
no cause. (Premise)
3. (Hence) It is not possible for reality to have a contingent initial state
that has no cause. (From 1, 2)
This argument is my reconstruction of an argument, found in the writings
of William Lane Craig2, which he claims has antecedents in the work of
Jonathon Edwards3 and Arthur Prior4. While it may be that this is not the
best possible reconstruction of Craig’s argument, that will not matter for
present purposes, since my main aim here is to investigate the first premise of this argument, and, in particular, to explore potential naturalistic
objections to it. I take it that Craig clearly commits himself to this first
premise, and that Edwards and Prior do likewise; further investigation of
exactly who argues what and how can be left to some other occasion.
1
If naturalists are to deny the first premise of the argument, then a natural
first thought is that they will claim something like this: a contingent initial
state of reality and the contingent things that feature therein are the only kinds of
thing that can have no cause. That is, it is necessary that non-initial states of
reality, and all of the contingent things that feature therein that did not feature in the initial state of reality, have causes. In other words: anything that
comes into existence, other than the contingent initial state of reality and
all of the contingently existing things that feature therein, has a cause.
If naturalists are to endorse this claim, then it seems to me to be plausible to suppose that they will also endorse the following claims: first, that
anything that is or can be a contingent initial state of reality cannot be anything
other than a contingent initial state of reality; and, second, anything that is or
2
“Professor Mackie and the Kalām Cosmological Argument,” Religious Studies 20 (1985), p.
371n3; “God, Creation and Mr. Davies,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1986),
pp. 167–168; “The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe,” Truth 3 (1991), p. 87;
and “Graham Oppy on the Kalām Cosmological Argument,” Sophia 32 (1993), p. 7.
3
A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will which
is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and
Blame Boston, 1754 http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/works1.iii.html.
4
“Limited Determinism,” Review of Metaphysics 16.1 (1962), pp. 55–61
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can be a non-initial state of reality cannot be anything other than a non-initial
state of reality. In other words: the properties of being initial and non-initial
states of reality are essential properties of states of reality. (And likewise
for the contingent things that features in states: something that features in
a contingent initial state of reality can only come into existence as a feature of a contingent initial state of reality; and something that comes into
existence as a feature of a non-initial state of reality can only come into
existence as a feature of a non-initial state of reality.5)
Among the questions that Craig poses to proponents of CONTINGENT
INITIAL STATE, there are the following two: first, if you deny that it is
possible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into existence uncaused out
of nothing’ in the room in which you are reading this article, how can you
allow that it is possible for the initial state of reality to ‘suddenly come
into existence uncaused out of nothing’?; and, second, if you suppose that
it is possible for the initial state of reality to ‘suddenly come into existence
uncaused out of nothing,’ how can you deny that it might have been hydrogen atoms or rabbits that ‘sprang spontaneously from the void’?
The theses sketched above suggest a clear answer to both of these questions. The enunciated causal principle tells us that it is possible for the initial state of reality to have no cause; and, in conjunction with the subsidiary
principles about essential properties of states of reality and things that feature therein, it also tells us that it is impossible for a raging tiger to pop into
existence uncaused here and now (at least given the further uncontroversial assumption that tigers have come into existence as features of non-initial states of reality). Moreover, in conjunction with those same subsidiary
principles about essential properties of states of reality, the causal principle
also entails that hydrogen atoms and rabbits could not have come into existence as features of the initial state of reality (at least given the further
uncontroversial assumption that hydrogen atoms and rabbits have come
into existence as features of non-initial states of reality).
2
Craig—following the lead of Edwards and Prior—has a response to the
proposal developed in the previous section. The naturalist cannot seriously maintain that kinds of things that come into existence as features of
non-initial states of reality cannot come into existence as features of initial
states of reality because prior to their coming into existence, things do not
have natures that could control their coming to be. If it were possible for some
kinds of things to be features of contingent initial states of reality, then it
would have to be possible for any kinds of things to be features of contingent initial states of reality, since there is nothing prior to the coming into
existence of those contingent initial states of reality to place constraints on
their nature and features.
5
These principles might, in turn, be taken to derive from theses about the necessity of
causal origin; however, I do not propose to explore this suggestion here.
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I don’t think that this response is satisfactory. Consider, for example,
Craig’s suggestion that, if we suppose that the contingent initial state of
reality had no cause, we are obliged to allow that it might have been a
rabbit ‘that popped uncaused out of the void.’ If it were really possible
that a rabbit might have ‘popped uncaused out of the void,’ then it would
have to be possible for there to be nothing other than a rabbit in existence.
But, I think, it is manifestly impossible for the initial state of reality to be
exhausted by the state of a single rabbit. Rabbits are not kinds of things
that are capable of that kind of lonely existence.6 On the contrary, rabbits
can only exist as part of larger networks of related entities. (It is also true
that rabbits necessarily have a particular kind of causal ancestry; however,
it would suffice for Craig’s purposes if the initial state of reality could be
exhausted by a single rabbit ‘duplicate.’ So this point can be accommodated by appropriate adjustments in Craig’s claim.) Moreover, what goes for
rabbits goes for almost all of the things that we see around us: all of those
things can only exist as parts of larger networks of related entities.
The general point here is that there is a good sense in which natures
do constrain ‘initial’ coming into existence: the initial state of reality has
to be the kind of thing that can exist even though there is nothing else in
existence; and the things that feature in the initial state of reality have to be
kinds of things that can exist as parts of an initial state of reality. If there are
very few possible initial states of reality—and if there are very few kinds
of things that can feature in initial states of reality—then Craig, Edwards
and Prior are just mistaken. The lesson here seems clear: our naturalist
could insist that there are very few possible contingent initial states of reality (perhaps even, as we’ll see in the next section, no more than one); and
our naturalist could also insist that there are very few possible things that
could have featured in initial states of reality. One consequence of the latter
assumption will be that very few of the things that now exist could have
featured in initial states of reality: that consequence will certainly suffice
to answer more general versions of Craig’s question about whether rabbits
and hydrogen atoms might have ‘sprung spontaneously from the void.’
3
Even if it is granted that the various assumptions that we have offered
to naturalists would suffice to defeat the argument that we are considering, there are clearly further questions about motivation and plausibility
that remain to be addressed. Are there deeper metaphysical claims that
might be taken to motivate acceptance of the claims that we have offered
to naturalists? In particular, are there plausible views about modality
6
In the present context, it would be manifestly irrelevant to object that there are good
senses in which it is conceivable or imaginable that the initial state of reality is exhausted
by a single rabbit. In those senses, it is also conceivable or imaginable that something might
‘pop into existence in my room uncaused out of nothing.’ Craig insists on a sense of ‘real’
possibility that is not contradicted by those kinds of conceivability or imaginability; I simply
follow his lead.
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and causation that could be taken to underwrite the rejection of the identified premise?
The modal case is perhaps easier, so let’s start with that. Here’s a very
brief sketch of a candidate theory of real (alethic) modality. There is an
alethically possible world in which there isn’t anything causal. All other
alethically possible worlds have the same initial state as the actual world,
and differ from the actual world only insofar as objectively chancy processes have different outcomes. Because objective chance is ubiquitous,
there are many alethically possible worlds. Some might want to allow
more worlds: for instance, alethically possible worlds that have different
initial states, or alethically possible worlds in which there are differences
in the evolution of states due to factors other than objective chance. However, the view that I am outlining here does not accept this relaxed austerity: those other worlds might be, say, doxastically or merely logically
possible, but that’s not enough to establish real alethic possibility.7
Now for causation. The key thought here is that causation is the glue
that unifies reality: what makes a given non-initial state a state of reality is
that it is causally consequent upon earlier states of reality. Moreover, what
makes some non-initial thing that features in a state of reality a part of
reality is that it is causally consequent upon things that featured in earlier
states of reality. (Given this way of talking, it is at least a doxastic possibility that, in the actual world, there are independent realities: causal
networks between which there is no causal interaction. But, of course, in
that case, I would use the word ‘reality’ to refer to the causal network in
which we are embedded. And, in any case, on the view that I’m developing, the claim in question is only a doxastic possibility.) Given the account
of modality—with its acceptance of objective chance—there is some sense
in which this view denies that causation is deterministic; however this
account leaves it open whether causation should be analysed in terms
of probabilities, or counterfactuals, or networks, or INUS conditions, or
transfers of conserved quantities, or whether causation should be treated
as a theoretical primitive.
It seems to me to be plausible to claim that these views about causation and real (alethic) modality provide support for the various principles
7
As Tom Flint pointed out to me, there are many other variants of the simple view proposed in the text. One might think, for example, that there are many really (alethically) possible worlds that consist of a single material simple; and one might think that there are many
really (alethically) possible worlds that consist of two causally unrelated material simples;
and one might think that there are many really (alethically) possible worlds that consist of
three causally unrelated material simples; and so forth. I take it that the simple view proposed in the text provides a minimal commitment for my naturalists: however real (alethic)
possibility is disposed, these things are among the real (alethic) possibilities. Whether more
than this is really (alethically) possible is something about which my naturalists might reasonably be uncertain: outright belief in the simple view might rely upon giving too much
weight to considerations about theoretical simplicity. On the other hand, the simple view
also has the advantage that it clearly conforms to the thought that the actual is the ground
of the possible: it isn’t clear that the way that the world is gives my naturalists any reason to
think that more is really (alethically) possible than is allowed by the simple view.
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that were offered to naturalists as a way of objecting to the first premise
in the target argument. Given this view of alethic modality, there is only
one possible initial state for reality, but it is a contingent matter whether
that initial state obtains. Moreover, given the role that causation plays as
the ‘glue’ that unifies reality, it is at least natural to suppose that, on these
views, the properties of being initial and non-initial states of reality will be
essential properties of states of reality, and that the contingent initial state
of reality and the contingent things that feature therein are the only kinds
of thing that can have no cause. And so forth.
Of course, what has been offered here is, at best, a very rough sketch.
But it seems to me that, at the very least, it suffices to show that, until you
explore the range of possible naturalistically acceptable accounts of modality, causation, and so forth, you cannot be in a good position to assert—
as Craig does—that if one holds that it is possible for something (an initial contingent state of the universe) to come into existence uncaused out
of nothing, then one is simply unable to explain why there are no other
things that do or can come into existence uncaused out of nothing.8
4
So far, this discussion has proceeded at a very high level of abstraction,
thereby avoiding questions about the nature and extent of natural reality.
(Is natural reality exhausted by something rather like a single big bang
universe; or is natural reality comprised of something rather like a large
collection of big bang universes, causally related to one another through
singularities, or wormholes, or some such? Is natural reality universally
spatio-temporal, or are there some parts of natural reality that are ‘framed’
by other kinds of external relations? Where reality is spatio-temporal, is
it the case that causal priority and temporal priority are everywhere perfectly aligned? Etc.) However, it is worth asking whether, if we descend
from these heights and focus on well-established features of the part of
reality that we inhabit, we might be able to construct a plausible case, for
the claim that it is impossible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into
existence uncaused out of nothing’ in the room in which you are reading this article, that is pretty obviously independent of assumptions about
whether it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the
causal relation. In this discussion, I take it for granted that, at least at the
macroscopic level, temporal order and causal order coincide in the part of
reality that we inhabit.

8
Of course, naturalists can ask Craig how he proposes to explain why there are (and can
be) no non-initial things that come into existence uncaused out of nothing. True enough, the
causal principle that he accepts—that nothing can come into existence uncaused—entails the
claim to be explained. But it is clear that the causal principle that we are here investigating—
that no non-initial thing can come into existence uncaused—also entails the claim to be explained. As far as explanatory credentials go, the two cases seem to be on a par. Before we
can make any further comparison of the merits of theistic and naturalistic explanations of the
claim, we also need to have some properly elaborated theistic theories on the table!
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Suppose that there is a table in the room in which you are reading this
article. Is it possible that a tiger ‘come into existence uncaused out of nothing’ where that table is? I don’t think so. I assume that it is just impossible
for the table and the tiger to simultaneously occupy the same spatial location: if there is to be a tiger where the table now is, then it cannot be that
the table also continues to be there. Thus, in the causal order, before the
tiger can come to occupy a spatial location that overlaps with the current spatial location of the table, the table must cease to occupy that location. Moreover, it cannot just be the coming into existence of the tiger that
brings it about that the table ceases to occupy that location: non-existent
things do not have causal powers, and the tiger does not begin to exist
until it occupies some spatial location or other. However, if that’s right,
then I think that we should say that the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it currently occupies is a cause of the coming into existence of the
tiger (given that the tiger comes into existence where the table now is).
But, if the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it currently occupies
is a cause of the coming into existence of the tiger, then it isn’t true that the
tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing.’
If this line of thought is plausible, then it generalises. Pick any tigershaped space in the room. In order for a tiger to occupy that tiger-shaped
space, that space must have appropriate internal and boundary properties: there are, after all, lots of ways that the boundary and interior of that
space could be that are simply inconsistent with the occupation of that
space by a tiger. But, if that’s right, then it seems to me that we should allow that the consistency of the boundary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—or, more strictly, the coming about of the consistency
of the boundary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—is
a cause of the coming into existence of the tiger. And, as before, if this is a
cause of the coming into existence of the tiger, then it is isn’t true that the
tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing.’
Might one object that, if the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it
currently occupies—or the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—itself has no
cause, then we would have a situation in which the tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing’? I don’t think so. Compare with a situation
in which there are several causes of an explosion: the presence of oxygen,
the presence of gas, the lighting of a match, and so forth. If we suppose
that one of these factors—say, the presence of oxygen—has no cause, that
seems to make no difference to its status as a cause of the explosion, nor
to the status of the claim that the explosion had a cause. Even if there is
no cause of the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it currently occupies, it will still be the case that the table’s ceasing to occupy the location
that it currently occupies is a cause of the coming into existence of the tiger; even if there is no cause of the coming about of the consistency of the
boundary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger, it will still
be the case that the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and
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interior of the space with occupation by a tiger is a cause of the coming
into existence of the tiger.
Might one object that it is a mistake to suppose that, in the imagined
circumstances, the table’s ceasing to occupy the location that it currently
occupies—or the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and
interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—is a cause of the coming into existence of the tiger? Again, I don’t think so. Compare with the
case of the explosion: nearly everyone accepts that it is right to say that
the presence of oxygen, the presence of gas, the lighting of the match,
and so forth, are all causes of the explosion. But the role of the table’s
ceasing to occupy the location that it currently occupies—or the role of
the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of the
space with occupation by a tiger—in the coming into existence of the
tiger seems to be on all fours with, say, the role of the presence of oxygen
in the explosion.9
Might one object that it is a mistake to suppose that, in the imagined circumstances, the table must cease to occupy its current location before the
tiger can come to occupy a spatial location that overlaps with that current
spatial location of the table, on the grounds that there could be an uncaused
instantaneous reorganisation of the constituents of the table in which they
become the constituents of a tiger? I don’t think so. On the one hand, it
seems to me that there are goods grounds for thinking that it is not really possible that mere instantaneous rearrangement of constituents could
transform a table into a tiger (or, at any rate, a tiger ‘duplicate’)10. On the
other hand—and more importantly—I take it that, even if there could be
an uncaused instantaneous reorganisation of the constituents of the table
in which they become the constituents of a tiger, that would not be a case
in which a tiger came into existence ‘uncaused out of nothing.’ Rather, that
would be a case in which a tiger came into existence ‘uncaused out of the
constituents of a table’—and so it would not be a counterexample to the
claim that it is impossible that a tiger ‘come into existence uncaused out of
nothing’ where the table is.
9
Perhaps it is worth noting that we can make the same kind of point in cases in which
we’re inclined to judge that there is just one salient cause. Consider a case in which a stationary billiard ball starts to move because it is struck by another moving ball. Suppose that
this is a case in which we’re disposed to say that the cause of the movement of the hitherto
stationary ball is the collision with the moving ball. If we suppose that the moving ball has
‘popped into existence out of nothing’ just prior to its collision with the stationary ball, that
supposition seems to have no effect at all on our judgment that the collision with the moving
ball is the cause of the motion of the hitherto stationary ball.
10
Remember: we’re following Craig’s lead, distinguishing carefully between real possibilities and logical possibilities. You might think that it is logically possible that the constituents of a table be instantaneously reorganised to form a tiger; but even if you do think that,
you’d need further reason to suppose that this is a real possibility. (Suppose that we adopt
the theory of alethic modality described in section 3. I reckon that in the set of worlds that
have the same origin as ours, and which differ from ours only in the outcomes of objectively
chancy processes, there isn’t even one world in which the constituents of a table are instantaneously reorganised to make a tiger. So, on that account of alethic modality, I reckon that
such instantaneous reorganisation is not a real possibility.)
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Might one object that it cannot be right to claim that it is impossible for
a tiger to suddenly come to occupy a tiger-shaped location in the room
in which you are reading this article on the grounds that quantum mechanics makes provision for just these kinds of sudden appearances? I
don’t think so. It may be so that there are various mechanisms embraced
by contemporary physics that could bring it about that a tiger suddenly
appeared in the room in which you are reading this article where there
was no tiger beforehand—quantum tunnelling, travel through space-time
wormholes, etc. However, if such things are really possible, they are certainly not cases in which a tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of
nothing,’ since they are one and all causal processes. If a tiger quantum
tunnels into the room from somewhere else, then that plainly isn’t a case
in which a tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing’; likewise
for a tiger that is transported into the room via a space-time wormhole.
(While it is strictly irrelevant to the present argument, it might be worth
noting that, even if this kind of quantum tunnelling were possible, we
could explain why we’ve never observed a case of it involving macroscopic objects: such events are so massively improbable that there is virtually no chance of a single event of this kind in a volume the size of the
observed universe over a time period longer than the currently estimated
age of the observed universe.)
Might one object that it cannot be right to claim that it is impossible for
a tiger to suddenly come to occupy a tiger-shaped location in the room in
which you are reading this article on the grounds that a special T-singularity might appear and then rapidly expand to become a tiger?11 I don’t
think so. On the one hand, there is surely good reason to deny that this
is a real possibility: perhaps you can make a mental picture of such an
occurrence, but why should you suppose that that picture corresponds
to something that might really happen? On the other hand—and more
importantly—even if the T-singularity ‘comes into existence uncaused out
of nothing,’ this would not be a case in which a tiger came into existence
uncaused out of nothing, since it is clearly being supposed that the expansion of the T-singularity is a causal process, and that the existence of a
tiger is the end-product of that causal process.
Might one object that most of the observable universe consists of spaces whose interior and boundary conditions are consistent with occupation by a tiger—i.e., that almost every tiger-shaped space in the universe
is actually consistent with occupation by a tiger? Put more vividly: might
one object that it is surely the case that the Apollo astronauts ought to
have been no less certain that tigers would not pop into existence around
them as they winged their way to the moon! Certainly not. Of course, I
agree that the Apollo astronauts ought to have been no less certain that
tigers would not pop into existence around them as they winged their
11
I am grateful to Peter Forrest and Greg Restall for being causes of the inclusion of this
paragraph in my paper.
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way to the moon. But nothing in the preceding argument requires the
assumption that the coming about of the consistency of the boundary
and interior of a tiger-shaped space with occupation by a tiger might
be the sole cause of the coming into existence of a tiger in that space.
On the contrary, the argument has only been for the conclusion that—in
the room in which you are reading this paper—the coming about of the
consistency of the boundary and interior of a tiger-shaped space with occupation by a tiger would be a cause in any ‘popping into existence’ of a
tiger in that space.12 (I suppose that, if it were so that almost every tigershaped space in the universe is consistent with occupation by a tiger, it
would still be the case that the coming about of the consistency of the
boundary and interior of a typical tiger-shaped space with occupation
by a tiger would be a cause of the ‘popping into existence’ of a tiger in
that space13: causal factors do not cease to be causal merely because they
are nearly ubiquitous.)14
Again, what I have provided here is no more than an incomplete sketch.
But, again, it seems to me that, at the very least, it suffices to show that,
until you have explored the prospects for direct arguments on behalf of
the claim that it is impossible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into existence uncaused out of nothing’ in the room in which you are reading this
article, you cannot be in a good position to assert—as Craig does—that if
one holds that it is possible for something [an initial contingent state of
the universe] to come into existence uncaused out of nothing, then one
is simply unable to explain why there are no other things that do or can
come into existence uncaused out of nothing.
12
Of course, it hardly needs pointing out that, if a tiger arrives in the room by a causal
process that plainly ought not to be called ‘popping into existence’—e.g., if a tiger wanders in
through the door—then the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of
the tiger-shaped space that is actually occupied by the tiger with occupation by a tiger is not
a cause of the presence of the tiger in that space. In cases in which it would be appropriate to
talk about ‘popping into existence,’ the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and
interior of the tiger-shaped space with occupation by a tiger must be causally prior to—and
hence causally independent of—the existence of the tiger. But in other cases—as when a tiger
walks into the room—the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of
the tiger-shaped space with occupation by a tiger is causally dependent upon—and hence
not causally prior to—the existence and presence of the tiger.
13
I suspect that it is false that almost every tiger-shaped space in the universe is consistent
with occupation by a tiger—even in interstellar and intergalactic space, tiger-shaped spaces
are typically inconsistent with (immediate) occupation by tigers. However, nothing in my
argument rests on whether this suspicion is correct.
14
I think that a minimum requirement for the real possibility of the ‘popping into existence’
of tigers in tiger-shaped spaces would be a distribution of objective chances for the ‘popping
into existence’ of tigers over those tiger-shaped spaces. However, if there were a distribution
of objective chances for the ‘popping into existence’ of tigers over those tiger-shaped spaces,
then—a fortiori—there would be further (probabilistic) causes of the existence of any tigers
that came into existence in this objectively chancy way. Moreover, it seems to me that my
naturalists could suppose either that it is really impossible for there to be any such distribution of objective chances over tiger-shaped spaces, or else that, on any really possible distribution of objective chances, the chance that a tiger ‘pop into existence’ in a tiger-shaped space
is vanishingly small. But nothing in my main argument turns upon whether the speculations
introduced in the current footnote are correct.
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In this paper, I have conducted a rough preliminary investigation of the
claim that, if it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the causal relation—i.e. if it is possible for reality to have a contingent
initial state that has no cause—then it is possible for other parts of reality
to have no cause.
I have suggested that there are various grounds—theoretical and commonsensical—for maintaining that it is simply not possible for non-initial
parts of reality to have no cause; and I have also claimed that these grounds
are pretty clearly consistent with the claim that it is possible for reality
to have a contingent initial state under the causal relation. Of course, I
don’t claim to have provided an exhaustive investigation of grounds of
this kind; there may well be many other ways in which one could argue
for the same conclusion.15
Because this investigation is rough and preliminary, it may have gone
wrong in various ways. However, even if that is so, it may still be that
the main aim of the paper is achieved: for the points that I most want to
emphasise are (i) that it is possible for naturalists to engage in this kind of
metaphysical theorising, and (ii) that there can be no justified assessment
of the theoretical merits of the products of such theorising that doesn’t
look at the details of the theories in question. It isn’t possible to assess the
merits of theories until those theories have been constructed and tabled;
in particular—despite Craig’s implicit suggestion to the contrary—it isn’t
possible to make justified claims about what certain types of theories can
and cannot explain until you have the relevant theories in hand.16
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15
Here is a sketch of a different line of thought. An initial state of reality establishes a
‘frame’ for external relations: space, time, and the like. Once this ‘frame’ is established, it is
impossible for another ‘frame’ of external relations to be embedded within it. Consequently,
an initial state of reality is—and must be—utterly different in kind from any non-initial state
of reality. Moreover, this clear difference extends to the causal properties of reality. On the
one hand, it is obvious a priori that an initial state of reality has no cause. On the other hand,
it is a plausible metaphysical speculation that the ‘evolution’ of the ‘frame’ of reality is, and
must be, causal. Development of this line of thought will need to await some other occasion.
16
I read this paper at the inaugural APRA (Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association) conference in Canberra on September 28, 2008. Thanks to all of those who participated
in the conference, and, in particular, to all of those who engaged in discussion of my paper.
Special thanks to Tom Flint, Peter Forrest, Greg Restall, and two anonymous referees, for
very helpful questions and comments.

